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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has engaged in an 
unprecedented number of joint contingency operations 
hinting at future missions aimed at protecting U.S. interests 
worldwide.  To engage and defeat future threats to our na-
tional security, the Army must transform itself into a more 
strategically responsive, lethal force.  This paper analyzes 
the effectiveness of Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), 
which can help lighten the force by providing support for 
brigade-sized units.  The Fire Support Simulation Tool 
(FSST) simulates the employment of various indirect fire 
courses of action (COA’s) for analysis.  Comparing the 
utility of several well-constructed COA’s using the FSST’s 
output can help decision-makers determine the effective-
ness of NSFS for specific campaigns.  The results of this 
analysis conclude that there is strong quantitative and ana-
lytical evidence to support the effectiveness of NSFS to an 
Army Brigade commander engaged in a littoral campaign. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been engaged 
in an unprecedented number of joint contingency opera-
tions that run the gamut from humanitarian efforts in Cuba 
and Haiti to peace-enforcing and peace-keeping in Bosnia 
to full scale war in Southwest Asia.  As stated by the Army 
Chief of Staff, GEN Shinseki,  
With the emergence of an increasingly complex in-
ternational security environment, sources of con-
flict and tension are increasing.  Sources of unrest 
and conflict range from competition between states 
to the instability caused by the collapse of states 
unable to meet the strains of resource scarcity, 
population growth, and ethnic and religious milita-
rism.  The technology enabling real-time transmis-
sion of information from any point on the globe has 
facilitated the rise of sub-national and transnational 
groups, including criminal and terrorist elements 
that may pursue objectives that threaten U.S. inter-
ests (Shinseki, 2000). 
Over the last ten years, there has been a steady increase 
in rapid-deployment, multi-dimensional, joint contingency 
missions to combat these threats.  As we move into the 21st 
century these missions will certainly become more and more 
complex and more commonplace.  To meet the requirement 
to engage and defeat these threats to our national security, 
the Army must transform itself into a more strategically re-
sponsive, lethal force that is dominant across a broad spec-
trum of military operations such as peace-keeping, combat-
ing criminal and terrorist activities, and full scale war.  
General Shinseki’s vision for the Army is one of transforma-
tion from a Legacy Force designed to defeat Soviet forces in 
Europe to an Objective Force designed to preempt and if 
necessary defeat threats from all corners of the globe.  This 
transformation should ultimately result in a force designed to 
take advantage of technology to facilitate the ability to rap-
idly deploy forces and to synchronize and integrate combat 
power through the design of compatible systems throughout 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marines. 
Based on General Shinseki’s vision, the Army is faced 
with the challenge of lightening the force while simultane-
ously increasing its survivability and lethality.  To do that, 
the Army must break free from the paradigm of a self-
sufficient and self-contained force.  It must fully develop 
its capabilities as an integrated, joint force able to synchro-
nize the lethal and non-lethal fires of all services at the bri-
gade level.  Reach-back technologies from sea, air, and 
space can provide Army units with added lethality without 
encumbering them further. 
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of Naval Surface 
Fire Support (NSFS) for use in supporting land-based 
Army forces in the littoral.  Rather than simply analyzing 
the different characteristics and specifications of available 
indirect fire weapon systems to determine their effective-
ness, a model was created.  This model, the Fire Support 
Simulation Tool (FSST), takes the capabilities and limita-
tions of the weapon systems being studied and simulates 
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This paper analyzes the data produced by the FSST to draw 
some broad conclusions about the future of indirect fire 
support for Army operations. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this paper is to determine the effectiveness 
of NSFS to the Army at brigade level and below in a littoral 
campaign.  In order to determine the effectiveness of NSFS, 
the objective is defined in terms of measures of effectiveness 
or MOE’s.  The process of determining the MOE’s begins 
by defining the problem statement in several more concise 
sub-objectives, called top-level objectives.  The top-level 
objectives are to maximize reliability, flexibility, and lethal-
ity.  They will be discussed in more detail below. 
When the top-level objectives are met, the system be-
ing measured or analyzed is effective.  The process contin-
ues by successively redefining each of the higher-level ob-
jectives with lower-level objectives that are needed to 
satisfy them.  These objectives continue to be redefined un-
til they are quantitative in nature.  These quantitative ob-
jectives are the bottom-level objectives or MOE’s.  The 
condensed objective tree (the intermediate level objectives 
are not shown) that was developed to measure the effec-
tiveness of NSFS is shown below in Figure 1. 
2.1 Maximize Reliability 
Reliability is an important part of integrating an asset into 
an operation.  For an Army brigade commander to effec-
tively integrate and synchronize the indirect fires into an 
operation, he must know that the asset will deliver its mu-
nitions on target at the prescribed place and time. 
To a brigade commander reliability of indirect fires 
generally consists of two screening criterion: (1) capability 
of an asset to respond to and engage various threats and (2) 
timeliness in its response to the request for indirect fires.  
Quantifying each of these objectives results in the lowest 
level objectives needed to measure reliability.  These low-
est level measurable objectives are the percentage of mis-
sions that the asset was capable of engaging, the percent-
age of those missions that were successful,  and the time 
that each asset took to engage each threat.   
The percentage of missions that each COA could engage 
encompassed the brigade commander’s first criteria for reli-
able indirect fires.  This bottom-level objective tells the bri-
gade commander whether the assets at his disposal can cover 
a sector of his tactical plan with the ammunition available. 
The percentage of successful missions pertains to the 
second of the brigade commander’s criterion.  Measuring 
the percentage of successfully engaged targets of those that 
could be engaged tells the brigade commander how re-
sponsive the indirect fires are to his requests.  It measures 
their ability to reliably engage the targets he wants engaged 
and inflict the requisite damage on those targets. 
The average time to engage targets is a measure of the 
timeliness of the indirect fires in a particular COA.  This 
pertains to the brigade commander’s third criterion. 
2.2 Maximize Flexibility 
Flexibility is the ability of an asset to perform and success-
fully accomplish diverse missions.  Flexibility includes 
more than the ability to range targets.  It includes having 
the right munitions to engage hardened targets and having 
the precision to engage targets that are positioned in awk-
ward or protected locations.  The sub-objectives listed be-
low were identified as crucial to measuring flexibility. 
High precision allows an asset to be used to engage 
targets that are in close proximity to friendly troops or 
noncombatants.  By measuring the number of errant rounds 
that induce collateral damage in each scenario, the simula-
tion can measure the precision of indirect fires in that sce-
nario.  By carefully modeling this parameter, collateral 
damage for different environments can be measured.  For 
example, in a rural setting, on average, collateral damage 
might only be induced by 0.1 percent of the rounds that are 
errant by 200 or more meters, while in an urban setting, 
collateral damage might occur with a 50% chance if a sin-
gle round misses its mark by more than 50 meters.  These 
specific parameters are included in the scenario. 
Maximizing coverage allows one asset to provide indi-
rect fires in the maximal number of situations.  By measur-
ing the percentage of the area of operations covered by in-
direct fires, we can compare the differences in different 
courses of action. 
Minimize the Number 
of Rounds that Cause 









Maximize Average Number 
of Available Firing Platforms Maximize Percentage of Successful Missions 
Maximize 
Lethality 
To maximize the effectiveness of lethal indirect fires 
available to Army Objective Force commanders 
at Brigade level and below in locations within 
 reach of Navy ship fires. 
Figure 1:  Condensed Objective Tree
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Ultimately, maximizing flexibility consists of the fol-
lowing two bottom-level, measurable objectives: number 
of rounds that cause collateral damage and percentage of 
the area of operations that is covered by indirect fires.   
2.3 Maximize Lethality 
Lethality is the cornerstone of Army operations.  Without 
lethality, or the perception of lethality, we are ineffective.  
Precision and massing of indirect fires attains lethality.   
By maximizing the availability of artillery at any 
given moment, we can measure the extent to which we can 
mass fires.  It is worthwhile to note that although this ob-
jective is listed under lethality, it is really a multidimen-
sional objective that gives the commander a measure of 
flexibility and reliability as well.  The average availability 
of firing platforms indicates how likely it is that at any 
given moment he can effectively engage a target (reliabil-
ity), and can serve as an indicator to the commander that he 
has the flexibility to shift assets and move assets on the 
battlefield to enhance his ability to engage the enemy.  Ul-
timately, maximizing the availability of firing platforms 
provides the commander with the lethality he needs to 
mass indirect fires, the flexibility he needs to move assets 
on the battlefield, and the reliability he wants to immedi-
ately engage targets as they become available. 
A single fire mission supports the overall mission of 
the organization by doing its part in the concept of the op-
eration.  By maximizing the total percentage of missions 
engaged successfully, the success of the mission is maxi-
mized.  This differs from the reliability measurement, since 
it only measures the percentage of missions that result in 
success of the ones engaged (# success/# engaged * 100%), 
while reliability measures the percentage of targets suc-
cessfully engage with respect to the total number that ar-
rive (# success/total * 100%). 
2.4 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
To measure the effectiveness of a specific course of action 
(COA), multi-attribute utility theory or MAUT, was used.  
This method provides a simple, relatively intuitive way to 
weight and quantify the value of very different decision-
making criterion. 
First, the decision-maker or his representative weights 
each of the MOE’s based on its relative importance.  Each 
raw score for each MOE in a particular COA is then com-
pared with the corresponding raw scores from each other 
COA.  The “best” raw score is assigned a utility of 1, while 
the “worst” raw score is assigned a utility of 0.  Utility of 
the remaining MOE’s is assumed to be linear, and is com-
puted using the following formula, where i = MOE num-
ber, j = COA number: 
 
Utility Score MOEi,j = (xi,j-worsti,j)/(besti,j-worsti,j), ∀ i,j 
The total utility of each COA is computed by summing the 
utilities for each MOE.  The best COA, is the COA with 
highest total utility score (Canada and Sullivan, 1989). 
2.5 The Simulation 
Due to the complex, stochastic nature of this problem, 
there is no closed-form solution to measuring the effec-
tiveness of NSFS.  Because of this, simulation is a good 
tool to investigate the effectiveness of NSFS using the 
MOE’s outlined above (Law and Kelton, 2000). 
The Fire Support Simulation Tool (FSST) is a dis-
crete-event simulation written in the programming lan-
guage JAVA.  The FSST uses Simkit, a discrete-event 
simulation package created by Assistant Professor Arnold 
H. Buss and LT Kurt Stork (Stork, 1996) written in Java.  
The objective of the FSST is to obtain the raw MOE data 
for each COA as determined by the value systems design 
described earlier.  By accounting for the stochastic nature 
of target arrival times and fire mission times, the FSST can 
draw a complete picture of the strengths and weaknesses of 
each COA in terms of the MOE’s and their variances when 
applicable.  This is powerful information for a decision-
maker and offers valuable insight into the performance of 
the assets being evaluated.  For example, a commander 
who is very concerned with success of critical fire missions 
might chose an asset that is more stable (has lower vari-
ance in success rate) over one that is more chaotic with a 
higher average success rate.  This simulation should reveal 
those chaotic behaviors allowing the commander to make a 
more informed decision.  Since FSST is easy to set-up and 
execute, it should also allow any staff to quickly create and 
run multiple courses of action (COA’s) for each scenario.  
The staff can then present the results and their analysis and 
their best scenarios to the decision-maker, expanding his 
flexibility and offering even more insight into the behavior 
of his assets in his environment. 
2.5.1 Overview 
The event graph shown in Figure 2 is a basic depiction of 
how the simulation works.  The actual model is too com-
plex to show in one simple event graph, but the basic 
model is depicted below in this one-dimensional event 
graph of a queuing model with one target or fire mission 
type and one server type. 
The circle with RUN sets up the queuing model by ini-
tializing all attributes.  The simulation begins with the arri-
val of a target that causes the model to initiate the arrival of 
another target at some discrete time, ta, in the future (circle 
with “Target Arrives, Request FM”).  The interarrival 
times, ta, of the targets are modeled by random exponential 
interarrival times.  When a fire mission arrives, it is queued 
if it is within range of a shooter (circle with “Add FM to 
Queue”).  The algorithm discussed above determines the 
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shooter whose queue that fire mission goes into.  If the 
shooter is immediately available, the fire mission is proc-
essed ts time units later (circle with “Attack tgt”).  The pa-
rameter ts is a function of the range from the shooter, the 
shooter type, and other variables. 
Once the target is attacked, if the desired results are 
achieved or the target has fled, the mission is ended (circle 
with “End FM”) and that shooter becomes available for 
another fire mission.  If that particular shooter has another 
fire mission in the queue, it services that fire mission ts 
time units later.  If the desired results are not achieved and 
the target is still available, the fire mission is immediately 
repeated, with effects being considered tr time units later.  
The parameter tr is based on the time it takes for that par-
ticular shooter to refire the mission.  Although this event 
graph does not depict it, the FSST computes and maintains 
the number of arrivals, the number of missions rejected for 
any reason (such as range or lack of ammunition), and the 
number of successful and unsuccessful missions. 
Each arriving target is identified and engaged some-
where in a box that we consider the area of operations.  To 
simulate different types of missions, units, and/or tactics 
the user can vary the size of that box.  Throughout the bat-
tle, these targets would be identified and engaged in differ-
ent areas of the box. 
The distribution of the arriving targets within the box 
is scenario-based, and can be varied by the user.  For in-
stance, in a guerilla-type operation where there is no built-
up enemy, and our forces are deployed in a decentralized 
manner, we might expect to acquire targets uniformly 
across the box since the enemy has freedom of maneuver 
and he is probably much more familiar with the terrain 
Parameters 
t a  = time between arrivals of targets 
t r  = time between recognizing a repeat mission and it being fired 
t s  = time to service the next FM in the queue 
k = total number of artillery assets available 
l = damage needed to ensure desired effects 
m = flight criterion of target 
inRange = computation to determine whether target is in range of artillery 
State Variables 
  TGT = number of targets that have arrived 
queue = number of targets in the queue 
  REFIRE = number of missions  refiired 
















~ BDA >= l || FLEE >= m 
queue.dequeue 
BDA =  U(0,1) 
FLEE =  U(0,1) 
BDA <l &  FLEE < m ~ 
Repeat 
( add  tgt 




REFIRE = 0 
TGT = 0 
S = k 
inRange 
t s 
Figure 2:  Event  Graph 
743
Ulloa and Paulo 
 
than we are.  By contrast, in a conventional-type operation, 
we might expect to acquire targets uniformly across our 
front and exponentially in the depth of our position since 
we own the ground we are occupying and have well-
defined boundaries that are protected. 
The user will also be able to tactically place artillery bat-
talions and naval assets in the area of operations according to 
the scenario.  Artillery and ships, once placed, will not move 
throughout the scenario.  Figure 3 is a graphic depiction of a 
sample scenario with artillery and naval range fans depicting 
limits of engagement for these assets.  The user will be able to 













Arriving targets are distributed
according to some logical distribution
scheme based on the scenario





Figure 3:  Sample Scenario Graphic 
Each scenario involves running the simulation for each 
COA listed above.  By varying the inputs for the model 
such as parameters for the indirect fire assets and the prop-
erties of the area of operations (dimensions and distribution 
of arriving targets) the FSST can model the scenario in 
which each COA will occur. 
2.5.2 Target Arrivals 
Targets arrive at a rate corresponding to a distribution.  
Based on past simulations, targets probably would arrive at 
an exponential rate with a mean based on the situation.  This 
simulation allows the user to determine the arrival rate of the 
targets and the mean interarrival time (i.e. exponential with 
mean 5.0).  Each target will then be further defined by its 
type – armor, armored personnel carriers, light skinned vehi-
cles, infantry in the open, or infantry dug in, and the mission 
associated with the target, destroy, neutralize, or suppress.  
Again, the user can determine the percentages of each type 
of target and the mission associated with each target. 
An example of how the arrival process works is as fol-
lows.  A random number generator determines the arrival 
time of the first target.  Another randomly generated num-
ber stochastically determines the target type.  A third ran-
domly generated number determines the mission associated 
with the target, and a random target location is generated 
based on the distribution of the locations of targets.  The 
first target then enters the model, and another target arrives 
at a randomly generated interarrival time based on the arri-
val distribution, and the process begins again.  The distri-
bution of target types and mission types used for this paper 
are shown below in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1:  Distribution of Mission Types 




Table 2:  Distribution of Target Types 
Target Types Percentages 
Armor 40% 
Infantry in the Open 10% 
Infantry Dug In 0% 
Armored Personnel Carrier 30% 
Light Skinned Vehicle 20% 
2.5.3 Target Servicing 
When a target enters the model, it becomes a fire mission 
and is sent to a specific artillery or naval gunfire unit called 
a shooter.  Each shooter is queried to determine whether it 
can range the particular target and whether it has the am-
munition needed to engage the target.  Once it has been de-
termined which assets can effectively engage the target, an 
asset is chosen based on a weighting of the following crite-
ria – platform or shooter type (NSFS or field artillery), 
number of fire missions in that shooter’s queue, probable 
error in range, and shooter to target range. 
A version of MAUT is used for the selection of a 
shooter for each target.  The value of each of the first three 
criteria for a particular shooter is compared with the corre-
sponding values of all shooters that can effectively engage 
the target. Subscripting the criteria being compared using 
the letter j, the utility of each shooter is computed with re-
spect to each criteria using the following formula: 
 
Utility = (xj-worstj)/(bestj-worstj) 
 
The total utility for each shooter is then determined using 












 The shooter that gets the fire mission is the one with 
the highest total utility score.  If no assets have the required 
number of rounds to effectively engage the target, the asset 
with the most rounds that can range the target is chosen.  
The fire mission is then put into the shooter’s queue.   
2.5.4 Target Engagement 
Each shooter engages targets when they are at the front of 
the queue and no targets are being serviced.  The process-
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ing time (tp) and engagement times (te) are randomly de-
termined from the distribution of the processing and en-
gagement times entered for that shooter, and the time of 
flight (tof) for the rounds is computed based on the target 
range.  By accounting for the rate of fire, the number of 
rounds desired, and the number of guns associated with the 
chosen shooter the total time for the fire mission can be 
computed using the following formula: 
 
tp + te + tof + (#rounds)/(# tubes)*(rate of fire) 
2.5.5 Mission Success 
The location where each round lands is determined stochas-
tically using the probable error in range, probable error in 
deflection, and shooter-target range.  The definition of suc-
cess for a particular mission is pre-determined in the sce-
nario, and is a function of the number of rounds that land 
within a certain distance of the target for a particular target 
type (i.e. armor) and mission type (i.e. destroy).  For destroy 
and neutralize missions that distance is the burst radius of 
the round.  For suppression missions, that distance is 2 times 
the burst radius since the objective is mainly to distract and 
rattle the enemy, not to kill him.  To determine if the mission 
is successful, the simulation compares the number of hits 
needed with the number of hits the target has already sus-
tained plus the number of additional hits if any.  If the total 
number of hits sustained is greater than or equal to the num-
ber needed, the mission is successful. 
If a mission is successful, the mission is ended, and 
the shooter fires the next mission in the queue, or waits for 
the next mission if none are currently queued.  If the mis-
sion is not successful, the target “remembers” how many 
rounds have had the desired effects, and the mission is re-
peated if 1) the target has not fled – determined stochasti-
cally by scenario intput and 2) if the shooter still has 
rounds available.  If both conditions are met, the mission is 
repeated, if not the mission is ended and is unsuccessful.  
The engagement time for repeated missions is generally 
faster than for the initial volley.  The assumption is that the 
guns are already trained on the target, and are awaiting re-
peat or end of mission orders.  The following formula de-
termines the time for repeating the mission: 
 
tof + (#rounds)/(# tubes) / (rate of fire) 
 
This process is repeated until either the mission is success-
ful, the target flees, or the shooter runs out of ammunition.  
The total mission time is then computed and tallied.  Suc-
cessful and unsuccessful missions are also tallied. 
2.5.6 Collateral Damage 
Collateral damage can occur each time that a target is en-
gaged.  If a round misses its intended target by more than a 
distance predetermined in the scenario, that round can 
cause collateral damage.  Each errant round causes a ran-
dom number to be generated, which determines stochasti-
cally whether that round causes collateral damage accord-
ing predetermined percentage of errant rounds that cause 
collateral damage (a scenario input). 
2.6 Scenario Development 
A scenario consists of the parameters that quantify enemy 
and friendly actions, the effects of the environment and ter-
rain on the military operation, the level at which the battle 
is being executed, and the year in which the effectiveness 
of NSFS is being measured.  These parameters are kept 
constant for each COA within the scenario so that COA’s 
can be compared using a common criterion. 
Terrain quantifying parameters include the size of the 
area of operations (AO), the definition of an errant round, 
and the probability of collateral damage by an errant round.  
Enemy parameters include the rate at which targets arrive, 
their location in the AO, and the target type (armor, infan-
try, etc.).  Friendly parameters include the distribution of 
the mission types (i.e. destroy, neutralize, suppress), the 
attack criterion for different targets (i.e. how many rounds 
to fire in suppression of armor), and the definition of a suc-
cessful mission in terms of how many target hits are re-
quired to get the desired effects.  Additionally, the scenario 
includes the weighting scheme the decision-maker uses to 
choose an asset to engage targets, which will be explained 
in more detail later. 
For this paper, two scenarios are being modeled.  Both 
scenarios involve effectiveness of NSFS to the Army Bri-
gade Commander.  The first scenario modeled is of a litto-
ral battle using the Army’s Interim Brigade Combat Team 
(IBCT) during the year 2005.  The second is of a littoral 
battle using the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) 
during the year 2015.  The year the scenario models does 
not determine parameters for the scenario in and of itself, 
rather it determines what technologies and systems are pro-
jected to be available, which in turn dictate the parameters 
of the artillery platforms to be used in each COA. The ter-
rain, enemy and friendly parameters, and level of the battle 
remain basically the same for each of the scenarios being 
modeled. 
2.7 COA Development 
Each COA is developed within the context of a specific 
scenario that determines the year and the tactical and op-
erational considerations of the battle.  The year determines 
the firing platforms available for the COA along with their 
technical capabilities and limitations and their locations on 
the battlefield.  The technical capabilities and limitations of 
the firing platforms include maximum range, firing rate, 
probable error in range and deflection, distributions for 
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target processing and preparation for firing, and the burst-
ing radius of a single round.  Tables 3 and 4 below show an 
overview of the COA’s and the factors that are varied or 
changed for each COA. 
Table 3:  COA Overview 
COA (same for each Scenario) FACTORS A B C D 
Field Artillery 3 0 6 3 
Naval Ships 0 3 0 3 
 
Table 4:  Hardware Parameter Overview 
IBCT FCS-OF Parameter FA NSFS FA NSFS 
Number Guns 6 2 4 2 
Rounds per 
Ship/Battery 2520 2400 2520 2400 
Range (me-




Burst Radius 50 75 50 75 
PER 35 100 1 10 
PED 2 2 1 2 
Max Rate of 




Normal Normal Normal Nor-mal 
Mean Acqui-
sition Time 4.0 5.0 2.0 2.5 
Acquisition 
Std Deviation 0.75 1.0 0.25 0.5 
Firing Time 




Time 1.0 0.5 0.25 0.5 
Firing Time 
Std Deviation 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.1 
3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The experiment was designed to measure the effectiveness of 
NSFS using a common sense approach.  The objective was to 
create and execute a design that was simple and could be eas-
ily understood by the end user, a military officer unschooled 
in operations research techniques.  Because of this restriction, 
the design consisted of a relatively simple simulation program 
written in Java that provided easily interpreted output.  The 
intent of the model was not to simulate every aspect of the in-
direct fire fight, but to simulate the more important aspects 
that are needed to determine the effectiveness of NSFS.  The 
MOE’s from the previous chapter determined the output 
needed for the simulation and the level of complexity with 
which to simulate the indirect fire battle. 
The experiment consisted of four different COA’s for 
each scenario, each with seven MOE’s.  Each of these 
COA’s was replicated 50 times, for a total of 400 simulation 
runs producing 2800 individual pieces of data.  This data 
was collated and processed using the MAUT methodology 
weighting each MOE equally.  This produced 50 sets of fi-
nalized output in the form of utility for each COA, or 200 
separate bits of numerical output each of which was linked 
to a specific COA for each scenario.  This data served as the 
baseline case to measure the utility of each COA.   
Once the experiments were complete, the data were 
analyzed using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) proce-
dure.  Two single factor ANOVA tests were used (one for 
each scenario) to test the null hypothesis (Ho) that the treat-
ment (COA) means were identical, or that total utility is not 
affected by weapon selection (Devore, 1995).  For both sce-
narios, the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that there 
was a statistically significant difference between at least one 
of the treatments in each scenario.  Further analysis of the 
data indicated that the COA’s consisting of a mixture of 
Field Artillery and NSFS had the highest utility using the 
equal weighting scheme.  A boxplot of the output for the 





1A 1B 1C 1D
Boxplot of Utility of IBCT COAs with all Weights Equal
 
 





2A 2B 2C 2D
Boxplot of Utility of FCS COAs with all Weights Equal
 
 
Figure 5: Boxplot of FCS COA’s 
4 RESULTS 
The results of this thesis indicate that NSFS can be effective 
in providing support for Army units at brigade level in a litto-
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ral campaign for the IBCT and the FCS scenarios.  The meas-
ures of effectiveness used for this analysis were fire mission 
times, available firing platforms, percentage of missions fired, 
percentage of successful missions based on all arriving tar-
gets, percentage of successful missions based on missions 
fired, number of rounds that caused collateral damage, and the 
percentage of the area of operations covered.  COA’s were 
developed consisting of different artillery task organizations 
of Army and Navy artillery for each scenario.  Using the Fire 
Support Simulation Tool developed for this thesis, each COA 
was simulated 50 times to get values for the MOE’s. 
Using multi-attribute utility theory each MOE for each 
COA replication within a particular scenario was given a util-
ity rating based on the actual value of that MOE/COA combi-
nation compared with other MOE/COA combinations in the 
scenario.  The final utility for a specific COA replication in a 
scenario was determined by weighting and then combining 
the utility of the MOE’s for each COA replication in a particu-
lar scenario.  Single factor ANOVA and Tukey’s procedure 
for multiple comparisons was used to determine whether there 
was a statistically significant difference among the COA’s. 
When using equal weights for all of the MOE’s, the 
best COA for both scenarios was the COA that consisted of 
a mixture of Army and Navy artillery.  Based entirely on 
the weapon systems specifications used, this result indi-
cates that there could be a scenario for the IBCT and FCS 
where NSFS adds more utility and is effective as a fire 
support weapon in a littoral campaign. 
5 ISSUES 
This analysis revealed that there is merit to the use of 
NSFS in place of Army artillery for reinforcing fires in the 
littorals.  However, nothing can truly replace the feeling of 
ownership that a unit commander feels by having support-
ing elements on the ground with him and within arm’s 
reach.  Most if not all leaders feel very comfortable with 
the capabilities and limitations of those assets they are 
most familiar with.  Joint training exercises between Naval 
and Army units are extremely rare.  Lack of that joint train-
ing and personal prejudices build distrust, which may 
prove an insurmountable obstacle if not corrected.   
Nothing speaks more highly of dedication to success 
of a mission than having a personal stake in the outcome of 
the mission.  Most soldiers stake their lives on the success-
ful completion of their missions.  If assets providing sup-
port in the form of naval gunfire do not have that same 
stake, Army commanders feel uncomfortable. 
The results of this analysis assume the relatively effi-
cient use of available assets to accomplish all fire missions.  
If assets such as naval gunfire can be called away at a mo-
ment’s notice, their reliability to the commander on the 
ground becomes suspect.  This leads to inefficient use of 
the asset.  Basically, the Army commander will try to get 
as much as he can out of that asset before it gets taken 
away.  This type of misuse will almost certainly create 
prejudice and mistrust among the Navy towards the Army. 
These issues must be addressed before naval gunfire 
can be integrated seamlessly into Army operations now or 
in the future.  Digital synchronization, future technologies, 
and memorandums of agreement will help, but alone they 
will not suffice.  Soldiers know that the soldier across the 
street will be ready because they see him and her working 
and training every day.  These issues of mistrust must be 
worked out on the ground, commander to commander, ser-
geant to petty officer, and soldier to sailor. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown that by combining the strengths of 
Army artillery and naval gunfire, an Army Brigade com-
mander can organize a fire support team that is better able 
to support his missions than a pure strategy.  Although ef-
fectiveness is strongly dependent on the weighting scheme 
the commander adopts for the MOE’s presented earlier, 
this paper has demonstrated that there can be an added 
benefit to using NSFS which should be explored further. 
Expert selection of the weighting scheme, inputs for 
the simulation, and scenario development are all necessary 
to properly evaluate the effectiveness of NSFS for the 
unique missions that will ultimately need to be analyzed.  
The FSST provides the user with a simple, easy to use, and 
quick tool to gain broad insights into the effectiveness of 
the available assets. 
Although there is evidence supporting the use of 
NSFS in support of Army operations in the littorals, there 
are a myriad of issues such as training, mistrust, and syn-
chronization that must be addressed to make these types of 
joint campaigns successful.  In the final analysis, it was de-
termine that there is strong quantitative and analytical evi-
dence to support the effectiveness of NSFS to an Army 
Brigade commander engaged in a littoral campaign. 
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